Introduction: In Maryland, there have been no military/civilian training exercises of the Medical Mutual Aid Agreement for >20 years. The aims of this paper are to describe the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), to coordinate military and civilian medical mutual aid in response to arrival of overseas mass casualties, and to evaluate the mass-casualty reception and bed ''surge'' capacity of Maryland NDMS Hospitals. Methods: Three tabletop exercises and a functional exercise were performed using a simulated, overseas, military mass-casualty event. The first tabletop exercise was with military and civilian NMDS partners.The second tested the revised NDMS activation plan. The third exercised the Authorities of State Emergency Medical System and Walter Reed Army Medical Center Directors of Emergency Medicine over Maryland NDMS hospitals, and their Medical Mutual Aid Agreement.The functional exercise used Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program tools to evaluate reception, triage, staging, and transportation of 160 notional patients (including 20 live, moulaged "patients") and one canine. Results: The first tabletop exercise identified deficiencies in operational protocols for military/civilian mass-casualty reception, triage, treatment, and problems with sharing a Unified Command. The second found improvements in the revised NDMS activation plan.The third informed expectations for NDMS hospitals. In the functional exercise, all notional patients were received, triaged, dispatched, and accounted in military and five civilian hospitals within two hours. The canine revealed deficiencies in companion/military animal reception, holding, treatment, and evacuation. Three working groups were suggested: (1) to ensure 100% compliance with triage tags, patient accountability, and return of equipment used in mass casualty events and exercises; (2) to investigate making information technology and imaging networks available for Emergency Operation Centers and Incident Command; and (3) to establish NDMS training, education, and evaluation to further integrate and support civil-military operations. Conclusions: The exercises facilitated military/state inter-agency cooperation, resulting in revisions to the Maryland Emergency Operations Plan across all key state emergency response agencies. The recommendations from these exercises likely apply to the vast majority of NDMS activities in the US. 
hospitals indicated how many patients they were able to receive through that same system. The State Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Medical Director and the Director of Emergency Medicine at Walter Reed conferred on the appropriate placement of the patients. Then, the patients were met at BWI and underwent triage, tagging, stabilization, and transport to pre-identified NDMS civilian hospitals.
Exercise
The functional exercise focused on the reception, triage, and transport of 160 notional patients and one notional canine patient by activation of the NDMS. During the Functional Exercise, "the patients" who arrived en masse on a C-130 aircraft to a designated location at the BWI airport, were triaged and stabilized while still in the aircraft or after transport to the Decontamination Area or triage tents, and were staged for transportation to the appropriate NDMS hospital.The receiving NDMS hospital was contacted to confirm patient receipt. Among these 160 notional patients were 20 moulaged live "patients" who were processed through flight transport to BWI, reception, triage, staging, and transport to Walter Reed, Veterans Administration, and five Maryland NDMS Hospitals. Triage tested the functionality of the Forward Deployable Digital Treatment Facility, a transportable, temporary, 20 bed triage facility (developed and supported by TATRC), available for mass-casualty reception when local facilities are inadequate or unavailable. Baltimore-Washington International Marshall Airport Fire and Rescue Department tents and an Air Beam Triage Tent were also deployed. After deplaning of 10 live patients, a break in the exercise was used for a debriefing, before restarting the Exercise and de-planing the remaining 10 live patients. Three methods of moving patients from the aircraft to the actual patient reception area were used to determine the most efficient methods of patient transport. A "hotwash" debrief followed the conclusion of the Functional Exercise and included reporting by the data collectors, observers, and all section leaders.
Functional exercise activities were recorded using a realtime video capture and distribution system and relayed to a remote Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in the BWI Fire and Rescue Department Station, to demonstrate the validity of previously reported preliminary work. [8] [9] [10] The video capture and distribution system consisted of 16 video cameras connected with a digital video recorder (DVR), a DVR viewer for real-time display of the 16 video images, and a wireless relay station for the remote viewing station at the EOC.
Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation team agreed that the Homeland Security Exercise Evaluation Program would serve as the basis for the evaluation tools, 6 from which the evaluation team created several data collection tools. The tools were distributed for functionality and usability evaluation. Data Collectors/Observers were recruited from those involved in the Functional Exercise planning process. They were briefed beforehand and asked to comment and recommend any changes to the evaluation tools. On the day of the exercise, the data collectors were given instructions, a radio, a clipboard, an audio recorder to record debriefing comments, and the data collection instrument that applied to the function they were to evaluate.The data collectors Introduction Medical mutual aid is the redistribution of personnel, facilities, equipment, or supplies as needed in times of crisis. 1 5a. All participants should be in one room to improve information flow: -There must be easier access to computers; -Tighter control by exercise controllers/facilitators is needed; -Mentoring by a NDMS expert during the tabletop exercise would be very helpful; and -100 patient casualties during tabletop exercise were insufficient to "stress" the Maryland NDMS Hospitals. 
Functional Exercise
To start the process necessary to conduct the Functional Exercise, the mass-casualty patient manifest was released by Walter Reed Army Medical Center 24 hours before reception of the overseas casualties at BWI airport. In the 24 hours after receipt of the patient manifest, the communication logs between Veteran's Administration Capitol Health Care Network, Walter Reed Army Medical Center, and MIEMSS showed military bed capacity would be exceeded by the numbers of casualties on the manifest. The NDMS was activated by Walter Reed Army Medical Center and preceded uneventfully, with well-coordinated military-civilian communications throughout these 24 hours. During the Functional Exercise, the revised Medical Mutual-Aid Agreement worked well as all notional patients were received, triaged, and dispatched to military and civilian hospitals within about two hours. Nineteen live "patients" were received, triaged, transported by ambulance to civilian NDMS hospitals, and administratively admitted. One acutely ill "patient" immediately on landing of the C-130 aircraft was taken to a Maryland State Police Helicopter for urgent evacuation. The one notional canine casualty (animal handling is part of NDMS in military contingency operations) revealed major deficiencies in handling, facilities for animals, and need for a revised approach (see Table 3 The Forward Deployable Digital Treatment Facility performed well, with good patient throughput because of patient gurneys. In comparison to the three other triage tents (Red, Yellow, and Green deployed by the BWI Fire Department), the military triage tent was better staffed, equipped, and more stable in the windy conditions on the day of the Functional Exercise. Greater patient triage throughput was related to having patients wheeled in and transferred to gurneys, rather than laid on the ground (as occurred in the BWI Fire Department triage tents).The larger, two-wheeled military gurneys were easier to maneuver in long grass en route to the triage tents than the smaller four-wheeled civilian gurneys. However, the gurneys were not interchangeable, as the military gurneys did not fit into the civilian ambulances, and vice versa, without patient transfer.
Video imagery from mobile devices gave coverage to the entire Functional Exercise site, and, together with video from fixed locations, improved the EOC's situational awareness. The developments in the Functional Exercise could be tracked, and the triage status of the "patients" could be determined immediately. A total of 130 minutes of video were captured and wirelessly reviewed in real-time at the BWI Fire Department EOC. The images were used as a debriefing record for the "hotwash" after the Functional during the Functional Exercise. Communications between military and civilian triage tents and ground transportation sometimes were impossible. Computer and video network administration support was essential in preparation for, and in the field, to enable successful deployment during this exercise. As a result of the Functional Exercise, 12 recommendations were made by consensus (Table 3 ) and three Working Groups were suggested to implement these recommendations: Group 1: to ensure 100% compliance with triage tags, patient accountability, and return of equipment used in masscasualty events and exercises; Group 2: to establish methods to make available information technology, imaging networks, and technical support for NDMS for EOCs and Incident Command Posts. The second working group would determine both a mechanism to support a planned coordination of access by various approved agencies and an emergency mechanism to support this action where prior planning is not feasible or additional entities need access; and Group 3: to establish an interagency multi-disciplinary Training, Education, and Evaluation Working Group to recommend training, education, and development of evaluation data collection instruments in conjunction with future large-scale exercise planning groups (Table 3 , Section 1).
Observations Recommendations
1. Each entity understood their roles in relation to the incident at hand. Command and control was established quickly with minimal disruption. Requisite reporting procedures were followed according to established guidelines, and memoranda of understanding were implemented immediately.
1. Continue to update and exercise activation plans and cooperative agreements established by state and local agencies.
2. All participants were intimately familiar with their organization's standard operating procedures with respect to disaster preparedness. Bed status reporting, along with logistics requirements, were communicated to Incident Command. The identification of local resources and admission was applied to the exercise play.
2. No recommendations.
3. During a NDMS Patient Reception, the reception site will be the most challenging area. Logistics coordination, along with identifying assets, interaction with the media, and various levels of command and control issues will enhance the confusion. Security measures also will require constant vigilance, as the reception operations are at a busy commercial international airport.
3. Ensure the Incident Command Structure is established immediately and is staffed with the requisite personnel representing the organizations responsible for supporting the incident site. Review policies and procedures to determine if all aspects in relation to supporting the incident site are covered, i.e., Public Information Officers, registration, escort issues, security, triage, and identification of assets.
Activation of NDMS is under the auspices of the Walter Reed
Army Medical Center; however, the use of these assets along with other Department of Defense units requires an execution authorization from the Military Command Authority and/or a mission request number.
4. Ensure standard operating procedures outline chain of command procedures and points of contact for possible use of electronic means (i.e., voice, fax, e-mail) that may facilitate receipt of mission orders.
One aspect of Tabletop Exercise 2 that was not fully realized
was that of the communications requirements with respect to the various coordinating organizations and their communications equipment. It's assumed that the local hospitals, along with their corresponding emergency medical services, transmit on the same frequencies. However, how will communications be handled with the military units operating in support? What will be the primary source for communicating-landlines, cellular telephones, or satellite phones, and where will these efforts be located? Also, are these devices approved for use in an airport flight zone of operation?
5. As part of activation plans and Mutual-Aid Agreement development, participating NDMS agencies should provide a list of approved communications devices and frequencies that will be used to support an incident. A full Communication Plan must be incorporated into the Incident Action Plan. 3a. For NDMS patients arriving at BWI, the patients/casualties should be deplaned mmediately then triaged, tagged, and treated with coordination of activities between the patient administrator and triage personnel. 3b. From information gathered from video documentation, conduct time/motion studies and consider with patient/provider safety to determine safest/most efficient method to move patients. 3c. Future Exercises should include medical personnel on the aircraft to meet the reception team and avoid delays on the aircraft.
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Patient Transportation and Tracking:
-Patient gurney civilian vs. litter (military stretcher); Small wheels vs. big wheels; -Litters/Backboards: Joint civilian/military familiarization training must occur. Military litters do not fit into civilian ambulances. Both parties need training; -Accountability: Patient movement items must be tracked. There is an inverse relationship built over more patients to less equipment accountability, and hence, availability.
4a. Joint civilian/military familiarization training is recommended to transfer patients from military litters that do not fit into civilian ambulances. Additional purchases of litter backboards and stretcher innovations should be considered to facilitate this transfer and allow faster movement of patients. Small wheels on civilian stretchers difficult in long grass, bigger wheels on military easier to maneuver. 4b. Triage tagging, patient movement item and equipment tracking, and accountability should be improved to ensure 100% compliance with triage tags, 100% accountability, and 100% return of equipment used in NDMS Reception to source of distribution. This recommendation includes establishment of a Working Group to solve these issues.
Command Post:
-Too many people made it difficult to hear and or keep up with information flow; -Video was useful; -Minimal technical support was available when needed; -Name plates are needed to ensure optimal function; and -Headsets are needed to minimize noise.
5a. The new National Incident Management System (NIMS)
Organizational Chart developed for the exercise should be backed-up by standard operating procedures for the positions identified. These procedures should briefly identify the position's responsibility. 5b. The NIMS Chart, standard operating procedures, and Incident Action Plan should be incorporated into one document to provide guidance for future tabletop and functional exercises or actual events. 5c. Incident Command should receive real-time information from BWI flight control (as was done in July 2006 for the repatriation of >3,000 evacuees from Lebanon).
Observations Recommendations 6. Decontamination:
-Have additional fuel on hand for the water heater -Consider a bladder for larger operations -Funding for full gear is needed in order to receive full training value from exercises -Better communication is needed regarding the scenario in order to plan appropriate response -Use another EMS team for medical surveillance to ensure safety -Personal protective equipment should be standardized -Stretchers should be used to transport patients to decontamination tent -Remove contaminated clothing to protect medical personnel 6. BWI Fire and Rescue Service should have Decontamination and Isolation facilities and the resources to provide training to manage decontamination of large numbers of patients. It should be noted that the assets currently located at the airport are intended to support daily operations of the airport and must remain available for that use. Local mutual-aid resources and additional assets may be required for an NDMS operation. Decontaminated clothing should be removed.
(NOTE: It is expected that during an actual event that decontamination would be completed before patients are loaded into the aircraft at the evacuation point. Decontamination was included in this exercise to test the worst case scenario.)
Forward Deployable Digital Medical Treatment Facility (FDDMTF):
-No isolation tent for patients with methicillin-resistant infected amputation -FDDMTF functioned well and triage was efficient, the FDDMTF asset was invaluable for casualty reception -Civilian EMS could use FDDMTF when other resources were unavailable 7. Establish the correct procedures and approval process for civilian use of FDDMTF. Isolate infectious "patients". and of military veterinary hospitals with contact information. 8b.There should be supplies, personnel, equipment, and transport to move animals from BWI to respective vet hospitals in quarantined facilities. It should be noted that the assets currently located at the airport are intended to support daily operations of the airport and must remain available for that use. Local mutual-aid resources and additional assets may be required for an NDMS operation. 8c. Designated animal exercise areas are needed at BWI.
(NOTE: Animal reception is not expected during an NDMS reception. This was incorporated into the exercise to allow the State Veterinarian and the State Animal Rescue Teams to experience an exercise and begin to plan for a mass reception of evacuated animals)
Assure Safety:
-Red, Yellow, and Green tents were not staked down adequately for wind -Patients were not properly secured to backboards -Triage of patient potential "real life" safety problem -No gloves in tent for triage personnel -Personnel Accountability Report was inadequate -No one was available/assigned to "spot" ambulances while backing up 9. Safety specialists should be gathered to re-evaluate all of the hazards of operating within the confines of an active airfield and develop a safety plan for future exercises or operations.
-Disposable ear plugs are needed for all participants -Provide hearing protection for safety of participants -Secure tents for potentially windy conditions -Hazard evaluation should occur prior to off-loading.
-Need to do a better job of incorporating Personnel Accountability Report into exercises.
Supplies and Equipment:
-Tents: BWI Fire and Rescue Service should receive additional triage tents to support contingency operations outside of normal response stock. -Soft goods/Class VIII Medical Supplies: There needs to be an onscene medical supply cache necessary to support first responder and initial re-supply that is housed in ready deployable plastic containers.
10a. Additional triage tents should be procured and stored at or near BWI that are more substantial than those used in the exercise, modeled on the FDDMTF, that can be adequately staked down and provide protection in austere conditions. It should be noted that the assets currently located at the airport are intended to support daily operations of the airport and must remain available for that use. Local mutual aid resources and additional assets may be required for an NDMS operation. 10b. A Soft Goods/Class VIII Medical Supplies Cache should be onscene, housed in readily deployable plastic containers at the triage site to support first-responders and provide initial re-supply.
Reception at NDMS Hospital:
-There was difficulty with Army bus off-loading and civilian personnel at civilian hospitals were unfamiliar with Army litters -No contact was made with the hospitals to arrange the monitoring of care -All exercise activity was halted before the contact could be made with all the hospitals.
11. Prepare a patient follow-up plan with input from the hospitals and WRAMC Federal Communication Center, educate all involved personnel and design next exercise to ensure that patient follow-up does not get negated.
Media and Very Important Persons:
-Develop protocol for working with group to keep from impeding exercise flow -To avoid confusion, during an exercise, information should be disseminated through the same agencies that would be the lead Public Information Officers in the 'real-world' incident -Difficult to access the patient due to photographers and Very Important Persons 12. Gather the associated Public Information Officers to review and familiarize themselves with the current media plan for BWI and research the best method to allow media additional access during an exercise without interference with exercise flow. 
Conclusions
This series of NDMS exercises has produced a plethora of recommendations that more than likely apply to the vast majority of NDMS regions within the United States.The recommendations included review of existing NDMS Mutual-Aid Agreements, increased training and NDMS exercises, and development of operational procedures for NDMS patient reception, triage, transportation, and staging. It was further recommended that military and civilian NDMS partners should meet to establish the NDMS reception plan, both for military casualty access to civilian hospitals and vice versa. All NDMS hospitals should have a reception team and performance measures for timely acceptance of these patients, and they should exercise their individual EOCs. The NDMS hospitals should jointly develop procedures for common tasks related to NDMS activation, sharing of resources, and assets for likely scenarios. Maryland Emergency Medical Services should have a formal medical reception team responsive in <12 hours and is considerExercise (see www.aaims2006.org). The institutional firewall configuration was a barrier for rapid deployment of video communications. End-to-end delay in video transmission was less than four seconds, mainly due to the wireless transfer. 8 Wireless transmission was needed instead of direct connection, because this latter was limited by the firewall.
Discussion
The Functional Exercise identified several issues which, in a actual event, could have adversely affected the expeditious emergency management and distribution of military casualties to civilian hospitals. The exercise also identified some weaknesses in the current response to NDMS patient reception. At two consensus meetings after the Functional Exercise, a series of recommendations were made to the appropriate agencies to improve the current NDMS activation plan (Table 3) .
Since the beginning of the NDMS, activation of patient reception in Maryland never has occurred, and since the only other exercises were in the 1980s, shortly after the inception of the NDMS, most of the exercise participants had no experience with NDMS response or in interacting with the US Military.The practical outcomes of the current effort are significant: The tabletop and functional exercises produced a better understanding of the current state of military/civilian communications by face-to-face meetings over the 14-month planning period. Through the course of this project, more than 20 inter-agency planning meetings were held. These meetings enabled the establishment of significant military-civilian collaboration. The planning built on experience and participants remained flexible to implement recommendations made from the results of the first tabletop exercise, which were used to improve the planning of the second and third tabletop exercises, and the functional exercise. As an example of building on experience and flexibility of the participants, during the functional exercise, a break was taken for debriefing after the deplaning of the first 10 of the 20 live moulaged "patients". As a result of this debrief, the reception, triage, and transport staging process was distributed more efficiently among the available triage tents for the remaining 10 "patients". The exercises allowed for identification of strengths and weaknesses in coordinating deployment of the Forward Deployable Digital Treatment Facility, and enabled testing of remote triage and tele-links to the BWI Fire Department. From the findings of the Functional Exercise, recommendations expected to improve response to NDMS patient reception were made to the appropriate state and military agencies. Developments in the Functional Exercise could be tracked and the triage status of "patients" could be immediately determined from the video imagery, thus improving EOC situational awareness.The benefits of mobile video and imaging for disaster situational awareness have been reported elsewhere. 9, 10 It was found that imaging networks and real-time technical support for EOCs and Incident Command Structure is needed to support both planning for and emergency access of images from remote emergency response sites.
There were limitations in what could be achieved with this series of exercises and their evaluation. Only 20 live moulaged casualties were involved, the remaining 140 were notional "paper" patients. With more real patients, a greater number of learning opportunities would have occurred, and more prob-ing the formation of mobile medical assistance teams for that and similar operations. Communication capability should be enhanced between NDMS hospitals and a single state agency. Video proved to be a useful tool to facilitate Emergency Operations Center coordination and situational awareness. Transfer of information between military and civilian patient tracking systems, alerting, and resource management applications is essential. Tabletop exercise participants should be trained in command and control structure, and communication procedures. Future NDMS exercises should include organizational and exercise control changes to improve information flow and learning. An exercise improvement plan has been drafted and is in the process of being implemented to address the recommendations.
